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In the present article we illustrate a Bayesian method of evaluating informative hypotheses
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The data-analysis in most psychological research has been dom-
inated by null hypothesis testing for decades. The evaluation of
null hypotheses is usually combined with p-values that give a
point-probability of obtaining a certain test statistic under the null
distribution. For example, the probability of ﬁnding a difference in
samplemeans whenμ1 −μ2 is zero in the population. Despite the
popularity of null hypothesis testing there have been some objec-
tions to the use of null hypotheses (Berger, 1985; Cohen, 1994;
Krueger,2001;Wagenmakers,2007;VandeSchoot andStrohmeier,
2011; Van de Schoot et al., 2011a).
One often encountered objection is that the amount of infor-
mation that one null hypothesis provides is usually nil (Cohen,
1994). Imagine that a researcher wants to predict adult IQ-scores
by height, age and IQ-score as a child. H 0 would state that
βheight =βage =βIQ child = 0. Rejection of this H 0 would tell us
that something is going on at best. It does not tell us which predic-
tors are related to IQ-score, nor does it indicate the magnitude or
direction of the effect(s). As a consequence the researcher needs
follow-up tests to establish a solid predictor model.
An issue in this example is that the null hypothesis is not the
scenario that the researcher was interested in to begin with. From
a theoretical point of view, a person’s height is an absurd predic-
tor for adult IQ-score. Put more scientiﬁcally, there is no previous
research or body of knowledge that would lead us to expect a
meaningful relation between height and IQ-score. Before having
seen any data, we already know that height is less likely to be a pre-
dictor of IQ-score than age and child IQ are. Unfortunately this
background knowledge can not be included in a null hypothesis.
The researcher might have even more speciﬁc expectations
which are reﬂected by inequality constraints between the para-
meters of interest. For example, the researcher may expect that
child IQ is the strongest predictor of IQ-score in adult life:
βheight = 0<βage <βchild IQ. We call this inequality constrained
hypothesis an informative hypothesis and it is denoted by the
abbreviation Hi. Hi is the hypothesis that the researcher truly
wants to test and it clearly does not resemble the null hypothe-
sis. Klugkist et al. (2011) showed that null hypotheses often do not
reﬂect what the social scientist really wants to test (Van de Schoot
et al., 2011c). Instead, they argue, the researcher is interested in
hypotheses that impose constraints upon parameters such as Hi.
From now on we will call these informative hypotheses (Hoijtink,
2012).
There are various advantages to the use of informative hypothe-
ses. First, it allows researchers to include background knowledge
in the hypothesis and directly confront this background knowl-
edge with empirical data. The use of inequality constraints makes
hypotheses sophisticated and speciﬁc, unlike the null hypothesis
which has a ﬁxed form for every research endeavor. Using back-
ground knowledge will also add to the cumulative character of
science; one can build upon previous research by including ear-
lier empirical ﬁndings in new hypotheses. The use of informative
hypotheses largely eliminates the multiple testing problem that
occurs when one needs follow-up tests to unravel an omnibus
effect. Taken together, informative hypotheses provide a solution
to many of the limitations and problems that are inherent to null
hypothesis testing.
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The reader may have noted that some forms of informative
hypotheses can be tested by use of contrasts. For example Rosen-
thal et al. (2000) illustrated several ways of formulating different
types of contrasts reﬂecting background knowledge. Silvapulle
et al. (2002) developed a two-step procedure for using null hypoth-
esis testing to test one single informative hypothesis for an analysis
of variance, see also Silvapulle and Sen (2004). In the ﬁrst step the
informative hypothesis serves the role as the alternative hypothe-
sis and in the second step it serves the role as the null hypothesis.
Van de Schoot and Strohmeier, 2011; see also,Van de Schoot et al.,
2010) extended their procedure for structural equation model-
ing. To conclude, if one wishes to evaluate one single informative
hypothesis, contrast testing can easily be used.
We acknowledge that contrast testing is a ﬂexible way to evalu-
ate directed expectations and that it can partly eliminate multiple
testing problems as well. However, contrast testing still relies on
the classical frequentist philosophy and the (ritualistic) use of p-
values, against which many cases have been made (Cohen, 1994;
Krueger, 2001;Wagenmakers, 2007; Van de Schoot et al., 2011a,c).
Moreover, contrast testing only allows the evaluation of one single
hypothesis at a time (Van de Schoot et al., 2011a). This may prove
problematic when a researcher is interested in a set of hypotheses
or wants to engage in model selection. For example, the adult-IQ
researcher from the previous example might have a competing
hypothesis which states that not child IQ but age is the strongest
predictor of adult IQ. The researcher, then, does not want to assess
the hypotheses one by one but intends to compare them in order
to select the one that best ﬁts the data. We get back to the topic
of contrast testing in the discussion when the reader has gained
familiarity with Bayesian hypothesis evaluation.
In thepresent articlewe introduce the reader to amethod for the
Bayesian evaluationof informative hypotheses. Thismethod aban-
dons point-probability estimates and null distributions entirely
and is both computationally and philosophically distinct from the
frequentist framework (Klugkist et al., 2005; Hoijtink et al., 2008;
Van de Schoot et al., 2011a; Hoijtink, 2012). Our main aim is to
make the Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses insight-
ful and accessible to the reader. We do not expect the reader to
have any mathematical or Bayesian background and avoid formu-
las and technicalities as much as possible. Instead, we provide the
reader with textual and intuitive illustrations of Bayesian hypoth-
esis evaluation and demonstrate the use of a free software package
that performs Bayesian calculations without going into detail1,
where many other resources are available for the interested reader
as well.
The outline of the present article is as follows. We will ﬁrst
introduce two datasets from existing psychological research and
formulate informative hypotheses. The purpose of these examples
is to illustrate the application of the proposed method. After hav-
ing introduced the datasets we provide a brief intermezzo where
we explain the key concepts of Bayesian statistics intuitively.When
the reader has gained some familiarity with those key concepts we
move on to the Bayesian analyses of the datasets and spend some
1Throughout the paper we will use a software package called BIEMS (Mulder
et al., in press). The software can be obtained through http://www.tinyurl.com/
informativehypotheses
time interpreting the output.Wewill thenmove on to seven gener-
ated datasets where we manipulated the effect size to demonstrate
how the Bayesian output is affected by differences in effect size.We
will introduce these datasets, evaluate informative hypotheses for
every dataset and discuss what we have learned about the inﬂu-
ence of effect size.We conclude with a discussion of themerits and
pitfalls of Bayesian hypothesis evaluation and discuss the value of
our method for psychological researchers.
INTRODUCING THE DATASETS
We believe applying our technique to existing psychological
research is a convenient way to illustrate the method. Before doing
so we introduce the datasets2 by explaining the variables and
formulating informative hypotheses3.
DATASET 1: PREDICTING OVERCONSUMPTION FROM EATING
BEHAVIOR
The ﬁrst research example stems from research on overconsump-
tion by Van Strien et al. (2009). Amongst many other variables,
Van Strien et al. (2009) assessed emotional and restrained eating
behavior with two sub-scales of the DEBQ, short for Dutch Eating
Behavior Questionnaire. An item used to assess emotional eating
was: “Do you have a desire to eat when you are irritated?”while “Do
you try to eat less at mealtimes than you would like to?” was used to
measure restrained eating. The scales had a Cronbach’s alpha of
0.96 and 0.92 respectively (Cronbach, 1951).
Both types of eating behavior were expected to be related to
overconsumption, which was assessed by asking participants to
what degree they eat too much. The development of a model for
overconsumption can help psychologists understand how emo-
tion and self-imposed restraints affect people’s eating habits and
health. The regression equation for such a model is given by
ZOCi = β0 + βemo · Zemoi + βres · Zresi + ∈i (1)
where βemo and βres are the regression weight of emotional and
restrained eating on overconsumption. The i-subscript indicates
the subject number and implies that participants can have differ-
ent scores on the predictors, overconsumption, and the error in
prediction. Z indicates that all variables were standardized. This
standardization delivers β weights instead of b weights, making
the regression coefﬁcients independent of the scale of the predic-
tor. This allows us to compare the beta weights of emotional and
restrained eating even if they have different ranges.
The researchers’ expectations revolved around the beta weights
in equation (1). First, they expected
H1 : βemo > 0, βres > 0, (2)
stating that both emotional and restrained eating are positively
related to overconsumption, Further, the researchers expected that
H2 : βemo > βres (3)
2Both datasets 1 and 2 were obtained from the covariance matrix that was found in
the original papers with N= 1342 and N= 2242 respectively.
3Note that the researchers used Likert-scale variables instead of interval scales. In
psychology it is common practice to use ordinal Likert scales in regression models
and therefore we will adopt this approach.
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stating that emotional eating is the strongest predictor of the two.
The rationale behind this is that emotional eating directly leads to
overconsumption. Restrained eating ﬁrst inhibits food intake and
only then rebounds, causing overconsumption. Adding hypothe-
ses H 1 and H 2 together leads to the more speciﬁc hypothesis
that
H3 : βemo > βres > 0. (4)
The researchers evaluated null hypotheses of the form
H 0 =βemo =βres = 0 in a multiple hierarchical regression
together with many more variables and complex paths not dis-
cussed here. They found that both types of eating behavior were
indeed related to overconsumption and rejected H 04. In the cur-
rent paper we show how the hypotheses stated above could have
been evaluated directly.Wewill also compare the three informative
hypotheses to determine which one ﬁts the data best.
DATASET 2: WORK-FAMILY INTERFERENCE
The second example we use comes from the ﬁeld of occupa-
tional psychology. Geurts et al. (2009) investigated the effects of
employes’ contractual hours and overtime hours on family life.
Contractual hours (contr) andovertimehours (over)were assessed
by asking participants to give an average estimate of working
hours.Work-family interference (WFI ) was assessed with a single-
item Likert-scale assessed “To what degree do you neglect family
activities because of your job?”. A model surrounding work-family
interference could be interesting to a variety of experts ranging
from family oriented psychologists to employer advisors and has
the form
ZWFIi = β0 + βover · Zoveri + βcontr · Zcont ri + ∈i (5)
with the notation being comparable to that of equation (1). Again,
the researchers had expectations about the parameter values and
direction of effects. The following hypotheses accompany the
original research expectations:
H1 : βover > 0, βcontr > 0, (6)
which states that both predictors are related to WFI because time
spent on thework-ﬂoor cannot be spent at home.More speciﬁcally,
the researcher expected that
H2 : βover > βcontr , (7)
stating that overtime hours are more important in predicting
work-family interference than contractual hours are. The argu-
ment here is that overtime hours are quite an uncertain factor in
an employes’ life and thus tend to interfere with planned fam-
ily events to a higher degree than scheduled contractual hours do.
Putting togetherH 1 andH 2 provides uswith themore constrained
hypothesis
H3 : βover > βcontr > 0. (8)
4The exact pattern was slightly more complex, involving mediator and moderator
effects that are outside the scope of this paper.
Again the original researchers used null hypothesis testing and
found that both predictors were signiﬁcantly related to work-
family interference. We will illustrate how the three hypotheses
can be evaluated directly and compared them to one another by
means of Bayesian statistics.
We will describe the analysis of both datasets after a brief inter-
mezzowherewe introduce the key concepts of Bayesian hypothesis
evaluation.
INTERMEZZO: AN EXPLANATION OF THE BAYES FACTOR
In this intermezzo we explain the necessary concepts of Bayesian
hypothesis evaluation without diving into the mathematical
details. For a detailed introduction seeVan de Schoot et al. (2011b)
and Hoijtink (2012). For an in-depth discussion of the Bayes fac-
tor and its properties we refer the interested reader to Kass and
Raftery (1995) or Lynch (2007). For more technical details about
Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses see Mulder et al.
(2010), Mulder et al. (2009), or Hoijtink et al. (2008).
In Bayesian hypothesis evaluation one may compute a Bayes
factor that expresses the relative support for one hypothesis versus
another hypothesis given the data.Whereas the frequentist frame-
work expresses hypothesis support as the probability of obtaining
data given the null hypothesis P(D |H 0), the Bayesian framework
revolves around determining the support for any hypothesis given
the data P(H |D). It is important to stress that a Bayes factor is
never tied to one individual hypothesis, rather, it is the relative
support for that speciﬁc hypothesis compared to another speciﬁc
hypothesis. For example, BF12 = 5 means H 1 is ﬁve times as likely
as H 2. This makes the Bayes factor an interesting tool for model
selection. As stated earlier we are interested in model selection,
speciﬁcally, we wish to compare H 1, H 2, or H 3 for all datasets
introduced above.
In the introductionwe announced that our approach abandons
the null distribution. We also abandon the assumption that a null
hypothesis is true. Instead, we think of the population parameters
as being distributed in a parameter space. Figure 1 provides an
illustration of the entire parameter space for our examples. The
two β weights could take on any value from minus to plus inﬁn-
ity, creating a large 2D plane. This entire plane is described by an
empty or unconstrained hypothesis of the form Hu: β1, β2.
FIGURE 1 | Sketch of parameter space.
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Because we can only determine a Bayes factor for our three
informative hypotheses in comparison to another hypothesis, we
will use this Hu as the opponent. The Bayes factor can then be
interpreted as a support measure for our hypotheses versus an
empty model and is deﬁned as follows:
BFHi ,Hu =
FitHi
ComplexityHi
. (9)
From equation (9) it follows that two ingredients are needed to
compute the Bayes factor: complexity and ﬁt. We will discuss the
two separately and then showhow they are combined to determine
the Bayes factor.
Complexity can be perceived as the quantiﬁcation of back-
ground knowledge. Let us determine the complexity ofH 1 tomake
the reader familiar with this quantiﬁcation process. H 1 states that
both β1 and β2 should be greater than zero. Earlier we established
that this expectation counts as background knowledge about the
parameters β1 and β2. Because complexity only depends on this
background knowledge we can compute it without having col-
lected any data. To determine the complexity of H 1 we should
ask ourselves which proportion of the entire parameter space in
Figure 1 is allowed by the constraints of H 1. As can directly be
seen from the hypothesis, only the right-upper quadrant of the
parameter space satisﬁes the condition that both βs are positive.
The right-upper quadrant is deﬁned as one fourth of the total
parameter space, and thus the complexity of H 1 is 1/4= 0.25. This
proportion corresponds to the redlymarked area in Figure 15. The
higher the complexity, the more vague the hypothesis is because
high complexity indicates a large proportion of allowed parameter
space.
With complexity deﬁned we can now look at ﬁt, which is the
second ingredient of a Bayes factor. Unlike complexity, the ﬁt of
an hypothesis depends on the data and hence can be seen as pos-
terior information (i.e., our state of knowledge after having seen
the data). Fit can be conceptualized as the proportion of parame-
ter space that the prior distribution and the distribution of the
data have in common. The higher the ﬁt, the better the hypothesis
describes the data. A ﬁt value of one, for example, would occur of
the distribution of β1 and β2 falls entirely within the redlymarked
area of Figure 1.
Now that an intuitive deﬁnition of complexity and ﬁt is estab-
lished, we look at the formula for the Bayes factor in equation
(9) again. Suppose two researchers compare their informative
hypotheses to the same unconstrained alternative. They both
observe a ﬁt of 0.80 but the hypothesis of researcher 1 had a com-
plexity of 0.20 whereas researcher 2 was more vague about his
a priori expectations and had a complexity of 0.70. Researcher 1
will then ﬁnd a Bayes factor of 4 whereas researcher 2 ﬁnds a Bayes
factor of 1.14. The higher the Bayes factor, the stronger the support
for the informative hypothesis against the unconstrained, empty
5BIEMS asks the user to determine the hypotheses and then computes a distribu-
tion of the parameters for each hypothesis. It is important to note that this prior
parameter distribution is not subjective, even though the hypothesis itself may be.
The prior distribution is chosen with desirable frequency properties, see Hoijtink
(2012).
model. This implies that researcher 1 is rewarded for having been
more speciﬁc than the other researcher. This reward for low com-
plexity only holds when the hypothesis indeed ﬁts the data well.
If the a priori expectation of researcher 1 had been inaccurate, his
prior distribution would show little overlap with the distribution
of the data and his Bayes factor would be considerably lower than
that of researcher 2.
Whenwe know the Bayes factor for two informative hypotheses
against their unconstrained models, such as the Bayes factors of 4
and 1.14 in the previous example, we can obtain the Bayes factor
for their comparison by dividing the two Bayes factors. This yields
a Bayes factor of 4/1.14= 3.51. Thismeans that there is about three
and a half times more support for the hypothesis of researcher 1
than that of researcher 2.
We choose to refrain from deﬁning when a Bayes factor is high
or low. Instead, we leave this to the interpretation and judgment
of the researcher. One question the reader may be left with is
“But how do I know if my Bayes factor is of 1.05 is signiﬁcantly
different from 1.00?”, to which we would reply “Do you think this
difference is meaningful?”. We want to make it abundantly clear
that the Bayes factor is computationally and philosophically dif-
ferent from the frequentists’ p-values. A Bayes factor cannot be
interpreted as a measure of signiﬁcance. Even if one would rescale
it into a probability – which is possible but beyond the scope
of this paper – it would still have an entirely different meaning
than the p-value does. We want to avoid a situation where read-
ers try to interpret Bayesian statistics in the light of frequentist
philosophy, or where cut-off values determine which hypothesis
is best. Rather, we believe in the judgment and interpretation of
experienced researchers as a key determinant in selecting the best
hypothesis. We realize that the ability to interpret a Bayes factor
takes time and that interpreting Bayesian output may be difﬁcult
for the novice reader at this point.
What we can say about Bayes factor interpretation is that the
value 1 is important.A Bayes factor of exactly 1 indicates no prefer-
ence for either of two hypotheses. A Bayes factor above 1 indicates
preference for the ﬁrst hypothesis in the comparison. In equation
9 that would be the informative hypothesis. A Bayes factor below 1
indicates preference for the other hypothesis, which would be the
unconstrained hypothesis.
Now that the reader gained some familiarity with the Bayes
factor and its (philosophical) properties it is time to look at the
analyses and output of the real-world research examples.
ANALYZING THE DATASETS
To analyze our data we used a free software package called BIEMS
(seeMulder et al., 2009;Mulder et al., 2010) which can be obtained
through http://www.tinyurl.com/informativehypotheses. We pro-
vide a step-by-step explanation of the analysis procedure and
provide screenshots of BIEMS. We have chosen to stick to the
default options in the software program. For a more detailed and
technical explanation of all the options and steps in BIEMS, please
consult Mulder et al., in press, but included in the BIEMS soft-
ware package folder). The analysis of the ﬁrst dataset (predicting
overconsumption from emotional and restrained eating) is thor-
oughly illustrated and explained. The analysis of the seconddataset
is discussed more brieﬂy.
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ANALYZING THE OVERCONSUMPTION DATA
Recall from the example by Van Strien et al. (2009) that we
formulated three informative hypotheses for predicting overcon-
sumption from emotional and restrained eating behavior:
H1 : βemo > 0, βres > 0,
H2 : βemo > βres ,
H3 : βemo > βres > 0.
(10)
BIEMS INPUT
Once the informative hypotheses have been formulated and the
data has been gathered, it is time to prepare the data for BIEMS.
A few speciﬁc requirements are useful for the reader. First, the
dataﬁle has to be of .txt format with variables in the columns
(no headers) and cases in the rows. Second, the dataset has to be
complete. Third, the columns should be in a speciﬁc order. The
dependent variable(s) has to be in the ﬁrst column(s), followed
by predictor(s), then by time-varying variables and ﬁnally there
should be a grouping variable (which is mandatory). If there are
no groups a column consisting of only ones will sufﬁce. Make sure
to exclude all variables which are not part of your hypotheses.
BIEMS will use all the variables in your .txt ﬁle.
Once the dataﬁle meets the mentioned requirements, it can be
imported into BIEMS. This is the ﬁrst of four steps. Figure 2 pro-
vides a screenshot of the imported overconsumption dataset. Be
sure to specify the number of dependent, independent, and time-
varying variables, which in our case are 1, 2, and 0 respectively.
The number of groups will be determined automatically, based on
the values occurring in the last column.
Once the dataset has been imported the hypotheses can be
speciﬁed as models in the second step of the procedure. Figure 3
illustrates this model speciﬁcation phase where we deﬁne the
hypotheses from equations (2–4). Note that in BIEMS, hypothe-
ses are called models. Hypotheses 1 (βemo > 0, βres > 0) and 2
(βemo >βres) have already been speciﬁed in the ﬁgure. Hypoth-
esis 3 (βemo >βres > 0) is being speciﬁed at the moment the
screenshot was taken. Note that we ask BIEMS to standardize all
variables.
BIEMS OUTPUT
After specifying the three models we ask BIEMS to generate a
default prior. Once the prior is speciﬁed, step 4 becomes available
where a Bayes factor will be calculated for each model versus its
unconstrained alternative. This step does not require further input
FIGURE 2 | Importing dataset into BIEMS.
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FIGURE 3 | Specifying hypothesis 3 in BIEMS.
from the user. Figure 4 displays the output screen of BIEMS. The
Bayes factor for every model against its unconstrained alternative
is displayed. For every hypothesis a more detailed output ﬁle
can be obtained where, among many other statistics, the ﬁt, and
complexity can be found.
For H 1 – which stated that both predictors were positively
related to overconsumption – we ﬁnd a complexity of 0.250, a
ﬁt of 1, and a resulting Bayes factor of 4.00. This means that
the hypothesis in equation (2) receives four times more support
from the data than an unconstrained (empty) model does. H 2 –
stating that emotional eating is more important for predicting
overconsumption than restrained eating – has a complexity of
0.500, a ﬁt of 1 as well, and consequently receives a Bayes factor
of 2.00. This indicates that H 2 is still a better model for the data
than its unconstrained alternative. Finally, H 3 – which stated that
βemo >βres > 0 has a complexity of 0.125, a ﬁt of 0.96, and a Bayes
factor of 8.04. This indicates that H 3 is eight times more likely
than the empty model it was compared to.
Recall that we were not merely interested in the hypotheses
themselves; we wanted to compare them and select the most opti-
mal hypothesis for the data. As discussed in the intermezzo we
can obtain Bayes factors for the comparison of two hypotheses by
dividing the Bayes factors of those hypotheses against an uncon-
strained alternative. For example, comparing the Bayes factor of
H 3 with that of H 2 gives a Bayes factor of 8.04/2.00= 4.02 andH 3
versus H 1 results in a Bayes factor of 8.04/4.00= 2.01. This indi-
cates that H 3 receives most support from the data, either when
it is being compared to an empty model or another informative
hypothesis. To conclude, we would say that both emotional and
restrained eating are related to overconsumption with emotional
eating being the strongest predictor of the two.
ANALYZING THE WORK-FAMILY INTERFERENCE DATA
For the second analysis – predictingwork-family interference from
contractual hours and overtime hours – we again prepared the
data ﬁle and obtained Bayes factors for all three models. Recall our
informative hypotheses from the introduction:
H1 : βover > 0, βcontr > 0,
H2 : βover > βcontr ,
H3 : βover > βcontr > 0.
(11)
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FIGURE 4 | BIEMS output screen.
The Bayes factor for H 1 against the unconstrained hypoth-
esis is 4.05. For H 2 it is 1.73 and for H 3 it is 6.95. Although
all informative hypotheses receive more support from the data
than their unconstrained alternatives do, H 3 ﬁts the data best.
Our conclusion would be that contractual hours and overtime
hours are both related to work-family interference, but the rela-
tion is stronger for overtime hours. A causal interpretation of the
results remains complicated because this research project was not
a controlled experiment.
GENERATED DATASETS: VARIOUS EFFECT SIZES
As mentioned earlier we also want to demonstrate how the
Bayesian output is affected by differences in effect size. The pur-
pose is to gather insight into the effect R2 has on the Bayes
factor (a concept that will be discussed in the next section).
This inﬂuence has never been studied before in regression mod-
els. Although our study is not extensive enough to serve as a
full overview, it does give the reader a feeling of how effect size
affects the statistical output. In contrast to the real-world datasets,
the generated datasets consist of 100 observations each. This
makes them more comparable to certain areas of psychological
researchwhere smaller datasets are common, such as experimental
psychology.
We determine the inﬂuence of R2 by generating seven datasets
that have different β values and therefore different values for R2.
Table 1 displays the exact design of the seven datasets. All datasets
were generated with theDataGen function of the software package
BIEMS. Figure 5 provides a screenshot of the generation of dataset
2 (see Table 1 for the corresponding βs).
The hypotheses we want to evaluate for these seven datasets are
a generalized form of the hypotheses outlined in the real-world
examples:
H1 : β1 > 0, β2 > 0,
H2 : β1 > β2,
H3 : β1 > β2 > 0.
(12)
Because we exerted full control over the parameter values we
know which hypothesis describes which dataset best (see Table 1).
For example, we know that if β1 >β2 then H 1 is not the best
hypothesis for the data.Wealso know that in theﬁrst dataset,where
both βs are zero, none of our informative hypotheses describe the
data well. This helps us judge the performance of our Bayesian
method.
We evaluated the three informative hypotheses in equation (10)
in the same way as the screenshots for the overconsumption data
illustrate. The ﬁt, complexity, and Bayes factor for each hypoth-
esis against an unconstrained hypothesis are reported in Table 2.
Note that BIEMS estimates the complexity and due to the esti-
mation process, the complexity for the three hypotheses will not
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FIGURE 5 | Generating datasets with BIEMS.
Table 1 | An overview of the seven generated datasets’ characteristics.
Dataset no. True hypothesis Dataset characteristics
β1 β2 σ
2 R2 N
1 – 0 0 1 0 100
2 H1 is true 0.16 0.16 0.95 0.05 100
3 H1 is true 0.27 0.27 0.85 0.15 100
4 H1 is true 0.39 0.39 0.70 0.30 100
5 H1, H2, and H3 are true with β1 =2·β2 0.20 0.10 0.95 0.05 100
6 H1, H2, and H3 are true with β1 =2·β2 0.35 0.18 0.85 0.15 100
7 H1, H2, and H3 are true with β1 =2·β2 0.49 0.24 0.75 0.30 100
All variables are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 and the regression coefﬁcients are uncorrelated. The sampling coefﬁcients are
identical to the population values.
be exactly the same in every analysis. For example, in Table 2 the
complexities for H 1 vary around 0.250 (with values being 0.247,
0.251, and so on). We know from the intermezzo that the com-
plexity of H 1 should be exactly 0.250, which corresponds to 25%
of the parameter space (see Figure 1). Averaged across many iter-
ations BIEMS would give us that exact value for the complexity,
but the results displayed in Table 2 are only an estimate of that
complexity based on one calculation. The reason for estimation
is that in more complex hypotheses it would not be possible to
determine the complexity based on calculations (Van de Schoot
et al., 2012).
The Bayes factors for the comparison of the three informative
hypotheses with each other were computed manually by dividing
the Bayes factors in Table 2. The resulting Bayes factors and are
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Table 2 | Results corresponding to the generated datasets: Bayes factors for each informative hypothesis against its unconstrained alternative.
Dataset Bayes factor
f 1,u c1,u BF 1,u f 2,u c2,u BF 2,u f 3,u c3,u BF 3,u
1 0.25 0.247 1.01 0.50 0.49 1.01 0.12 0.12 0.99
H1 ISTRUE
2 0.88 0.251 3.56 0.49 0.503 0.99 0.44 0.124 3.51
3 0.99 0.250 3.90 0.49 0.499 1.00 0.49 0.124 3.97
4 0.99 0.251 3.95 0.50 0.498 1.01 0.49 0.125 3.96
H1, H2,AND H3 ARETRUEWITH β1 =2·β2
5 0.81 0.252 3.29 0.73 0.500 1.50 0.58 0.126 4.66
6 0.96 0.247 3.84 0.88 0.500 1.76 0.84 0.125 6.62
7 0.99 0.250 3.93 0.96 0.496 1.90 0.94 0.126 7.60
Table 3 | Bayes factors for the comparison of the informative
hypotheses with one another.
Dataset Bayes factor
BF 12 BF 13 BF 23
1 1.00 1.02 1.02
H1 ISTRUE
2 3.59 1.01 0.28
3 3.90 0.98 0.25
4 3.91 0.99 0.25
H1, H2, AND H3 ARETRUE
5 2.19 0.71 0.32
6 2.18 0.58 0.26
7 2.07 0.52 0.25
displayed in Table 3. Note that BF12 denotes the Bayes factor for
the comparison of H 1 versusH 2 and indicates the relative support
for H 1 in this comparison.
Recall from the intermezzo that the complexity of an hypoth-
esis is not inﬂuenced by the data. The complexity of H 1, H 2, and
H 3 can be found in Table 2. Here we see that the hypotheses
indeed have the same complexity no matter for which dataset it
was computed.We also observe that the complexity ofH 1 is indeed
0.25, something we graphically illustrated before in Figure 1. In
addition Table 2 reveals that the average complexity is largely
determined by the amount of constraints: one constraint in H 2
(c= 0.500), two constraints in H 1 (c= 0.250), and three con-
straints in H 3 (c= 0.125). As for the ﬁt values, we know from
the intermezzo that they are inﬂuenced by the data. Indeed, we
see that the ﬁt increases as the effect size increases. For the com-
putation of the Bayes factor this means that a larger and larger
ﬁt value is divided by a constant complexity, implying that the
Bayes factor will increase as well. This is exactly what we see in
Table 2.
Let us now look at some individual cells from Table 2. We see
that for dataset 1, when R2 = 0 and none of the hypotheses ﬁt
the data, the Bayes factors for all three hypotheses are around 1.
This indicates that there is about equal support for the informative
hypotheses as there is for the unconstrained hypothesis. Of course
a researcher could still choose to prefer the informative hypoth-
esis in this case, but his decision would be hard to sell. Instead
we conclude that none of our hypotheses provides an accurate
description of the data in dataset 1. Note that this corresponds
to the prediction we made when we introduced the generated
datasets.
Recall that the higher the Bayes factor is, the more support we
have for our hypothesis versus an empty hypothesis. In datasets
2–4 we see a clear preference for H 1 and H 3. Note that the ﬁt for
H 3 is lower than that for H 1, but because H 3 has a lower com-
plexity it receives roughly the same Bayes factor as H 1 does. This
can be understood when we see H 1 (β1 > 0, β2 > 0) as a subset of
H 3 (β1 >β2 > 0). Thus, when H 1 is accurate,H 3 is at least partly
accurate as well. When we compare H 1 and H 3 for datasets 2–4
in Table 3 we see that we end up with roughly equal support for
both hypotheses. Looking at Table 2 again we see that H 2 does
not receive support from the data, nor does it receive counter-
evidence. The BF for this hypothesis remains stable around 1.
When we compare H 2 to either H 1 or H 3 in Table 3 we see a
clear preference for the other hypotheses.We would conclude that
in datasets 2–4, where the βs are equal, we do not ﬁnd support
for the claim that β1 >β2. Note that this conclusion is the same
whether we look at dataset 2 (whereR2 = 0.05) or dataset 4 (where
R2 = 0.30).
When we look at datasets 5–7 in Table 2 we see that the sup-
port for H 1 remains the same as it was in datasets 2–4, but the
support for H 2 and H 3 increases. This is because there is now an
actual difference between the two βs in the data (see Table 1).
Note that the ﬁt of H 2 is a bit higher than that of H 3, but
because H 2 imposes less constraints it has a higher complexity
which results in lower Bayes factors. This is another examplewhere
the researcher is rewarded for having been speciﬁc when H 3 was
formulated.
Because in datasets 5–7 we receive support for all informative
hypotheses versus the unconstrained model, it becomes especially
interesting to see which of the three ﬁts the data best. This can be
deduced from Table 3 where we see thatH 3 receivesmost support.
We would conclude that in datasets 5–7 both βs are bigger than
zero and β1 is bigger than β2. Again we achieve this conclusion
whether we look at dataset 5 (whereR2 = 0.05) or dataset 7 (where
R2 = 0.30).
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The generated datasets were designed to demonstrate how R2
inﬂuences the results of Bayesian statistics. After having seen these
results we would say that even when effect size is zero or relatively
low the Bayes factor helps us choose an accurate model for the
data.We conclude that the Bayes factor can be used even when the
researcher expects a small effect.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we have illustrated how informative hypotheses
can be evaluated by means of Bayesian statistics. We applied the
method to existing psychological research, where we showed the
reader the process of formulating informative hypotheses, evalu-
ating them in light of the data, and interpreting the outcomes. In
addition to this application we generated and analyzed datasets
with manipulated differences in effect size. This endeavor demon-
strated how the Bayes factor was or was not affected by the
magnitude of an effect.Wenow reviewour ﬁndings anddiscuss the
practical value of Bayesian hypothesis evaluation for psychological
researchers.
In the introduction we claimed that the null hypothesis is
often not the expectation that a psychological researcher wishes
to evaluate. Instead we argued that researchers often have very
speciﬁc prior expectations about parameter values. In the real-
world examples for overconsumption and work-family inter-
ference we saw that this was indeed the case: researchers had
prior expectations about the direction and magnitude of the
effects. We formulated these prior expectations and put them in
the form of informative hypotheses. We then pursued to eval-
uate these hypotheses and express support for or against them.
We were able to point out which hypothesis ﬁt the data best
without having used any null hypothesis. Moreover, we pro-
vided the reader with a step-by-step guide to enable him to do
the same.
From the generated datasets we saw that the Bayes factor helps
us select one of three models even when effect sizes are relatively
low. We also saw that the Bayes factor increased when effect size
did, reﬂecting more and more certainty about the parameter val-
ues as the magnitude of the effect increased. The tables in which
we summarized the statistics will help the reader decide whether
the approach is appealing enough for the effect sizes he/she is
expecting.
In sum, we have provided the reader with a non-technical
introduction to Bayesian hypothesis evaluation while avoiding
technical or mathematical language. Unfortunately there are some
limitations to this paper. For example, we have chosen artiﬁ-
cially simple designs with only two predictors and one crite-
rion each. We acknowledge that the reader will likely be con-
fronted with more complex designs in practice. For informative
hypothesis testing in structural equation modeling, for example,
please consult Van de Schoot et al. (2012). Second, our gener-
ated datasets were nowhere near exhaustive. It would have been
more thorough to also vary sample size. Third, we made a con-
scious choice to omit mathematical formulas or calculations. This
means that the reader should either trust our intuitive expla-
nations or read further into the method. For technical details
of our proposed methodology we refer the interested reader to
Mulder et al. (2010). Fourth, we deliberately chose not to make
this paper a comparison between null hypothesis testing and the
Bayesian evaluation of informative hypotheses. For such com-
parisons we refer the reader to Kuiper and Hoijtink (2010) or
Van de Schoot et al. (2011a). Moreover, we chose not to provide
the reader with any guidelines or cut-off values to interpret the
Bayesian output. This may seem unfriendly, especially because we
expect the reader to be a novice. Although we had good reasons
to exclude comparisons and cook-book rules, we acknowledge
that the lack of both may have been hard on the reader. For
more details on interpreting the Bayes factor see Kass and Raftery
(1995).
In the introduction we promised to get back to the subject of
contrast testing. We then acknowledged that contrast testing is a
ﬂexible tool to evaluate one informative hypothesis. Nevertheless
we stillmaintain that there are two important reasons for switching
to Bayesian hypothesis evaluation.
First, contrast testing only allow the evaluation of one single
informative hypothesis. It does not provide an option for compar-
ing competing hypotheses, which is essentially what model selec-
tion is about. The Bayesian evaluation of informative hypothesis
does allow the simultaneous evaluation of multiple informative
hypothesis and, as we have demonstrated, assists the researcher in
selecting one hypothesis from a set of hypotheses.
Second, although there is nothing wrong with null hypoth-
esis testing, the philosophy behind Bayesian hypothesis evalu-
ation may simply be more interesting to some researchers. In
Bayesian statistics the focus is on updating the state of knowl-
edge: we quantiﬁed what we knew about parameters before we
saw any data and we updated this quantity after having seen
the data. The knowledge one gathers from one Bayesian analy-
sis may serve as background knowledge for the next, creating an
accumulative science. In addition, Bayesian statistics focus on the
support for a model rather than on p-values. This brings with
it an entirely different line of interpreting and thinking about
statistics.
Of course there are certain situations in which the evaluation of
informative hypotheses is not optimal. For example, a researcher
may ﬁnd himself truly interested in the null hypothesis (Wainer,
1999). Note that in this situation the researcher may still choose
between Bayesian and frequentist statistics as both frameworks
can handle null hypotheses. The choice will then likely be deter-
mined by which framework’s philosophy is most appealing to the
researcher.
To conclude, we hope to have awakened some interest and
awareness in the reader. We would advise the curious reader
to become acquainted with informative hypotheses and their
Bayesian evaluation through experimentation and literature. The
Bayesian hypothesis evaluation we illustratedmay not replace null
hypothesis testing entirely, but it may be a welcome addition to a
researcher’s toolbox.
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